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THE INDIVIDUAL
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BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

THE SPIRITUAL OUTLOOK
OF EUROPE

BY
RUDOLF EUCKEN.

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THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

BY
RUDOLF EUCKEN

TRANSLATED BY W. R. V. BRADE.

WITH A PREFACE BY THE .
AUTHOR OF "NATIONAL REVIVAL"

1923

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PREFACE.

By the author of "NATIONAL REVIVAL."

FOR many years Professor Eucken has been one of our most eminent thinkers. To-day his eminence—it seems to me *pre-eminence*—is so well established that any words of introduction would be a slight upon him. Moreover, this book which he has written for the Faith Press is so clear that explanation seems unnecessary. I have promised to write a preface, but there seems nothing for me to do except to call attention to his conclusion.

Everywhere men are at sixes and sevens with each other. It is quite true that such a chaos cannot be a basis of *order* or of anything that would deserve to be called civilisation. What then should be done?

Not unnaturally, men turn to the State. Not unnaturally, I say, for although the State is thought of very diversely, there is a general consent that it does represent, ill or well, *unity and order*.

Now, State-action implies a theory of State-action. The State never acts unless it has some idea of what it is about. Even the merely opportunist State tries to justify itself to its own mind,—at least, one hopes so. Sooner or later, in the course of its

action, the State has to ask itself questions; sooner or later, it is asked questions. And the more important of these questions are all of them forms of an ancient one,—*Quo Warranto?* “By what authority doest thou these things?”

We are at sixes and sevens. The State steps in, and tries to get us into some order a little less intolerable than our *disorder*. On waywardness and selfishness it imposes the ideal of the *Whole*. But what *is* the Whole? And what is the normal relation, the right relation between the Whole and its parts? Our politicians do not know,—they cheerfully essay to practice as an Art what they have never learnt as a Science and a Theory.

The country has suffered much from this ignorance, and the time when one could safely wink at it has long since passed away. We must face the fact that politics without thought is as poor and as dangerous a thing as religion without doctrine. We are confronted with political problems which go down to the foundations of faith and the sources of life,—we stumble along, first in this direction and then in that, and please ourselves with the delusion that we are “exploring avenues,”—we make society and individuals the patient subject of blind experiments,—and that is all. It never occurs to us to ascertain either the *nature* of Society or the principles which that Nature makes

normal for our political action within and upon Society.

In this little book Professor Eucken has done us no small service for he has brought us face to face with things that matter. Indeed, if we read his book with attention, we shall say (I think) that he has brought us face to face with our failure.

The failure, however, is not final, and Professor Eucken does not represent it as final. On the contrary, he asks us to seek light and strength for a new effort by returning to Religion.

This is precisely as it should be,—precisely what we need.

Politics is not everything. It deals with but one aspect of life, and its purposes are far from being all inclusive. The life which it tries to make civic arises from sources which lie outside the sphere which is distinctively its own, and, other than the forces and thoughts brought to birth in that life, it has no means of doing its work.

What should one infer from that? Surely this:—when our political resources seem to be exhausted, when political thought seems bankrupt, we must try to bring life to a new birth. Politics is not an abstract science, not a cogitation *in vacuo*. True, it is a theory, but it is a theory intended to *work*,—

a theory determined by practical needs to practical ends. It becomes bankrupt only when the life which informs it and circumscribes it is bankrupt. A renewing of life will create new energies and new thoughts and these will give politics a new start.

To-day we need a new start badly. The problems which confront us are beyond the competence of our traditions and our textbooks. Political thought must be "born again." I feel sure that only Religion can give us a new start.

Every now and then, some Christian thinker tells us that it is a mistake to look to the Church for practical guidance in these matters, for the Christian religion has no politics, no economics,—in a word, no sociology.

I feel sure that these pious men are wrong. The Christian religion has a highly distinctive sociology. It is to be found in St. Paul's conception of the Body of Christ. Do not suppose this to be merely a piece of theology. It is vividly and urgently practical. It contains a new norm for industry, a new conception of society, a new conception of the primary relation between man and man.

The latest exposition of it—one that should be amplified as soon as possible—is to be found in a book which was published by the Faith Press a year or two ago. Everyone

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INTRODUCTORY.

WE shall begin with the history of the problem before us; such an enquiry is peculiarly fitted to serve as an introduction to the questions with which we shall have to deal. Our task will then be to discuss the present position and to enquire what help we can find towards the solving of the chief problems.

I.—THE GENERAL HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY.

A. *The Ancient Period.*

The expression "individual" calls for a brief elucidation. It is a word borrowed from philosophy and is really a translation of "atom," the leading concept of Democritus. It signifies something that cannot be broken up or divided into parts, in Cicero it has this meaning given to it. But in the later antiquity "individual" had already come to mean also the singular as characterised by its singularity, by its separateness from others, that which, as it now exists, existed never elsewhere. This more limited meaning maintained itself side by side with the wider signification. The whole mediæval period followed the definition given by Porphyry in the third century, namely, that the individual is something consisting of properties whose combination can never be the same again in any other subject whatsoever. Thus, for example, taught J. Thomasius, the teacher of Leibniz. And Leibniz it was, more than any other philosopher, who introduced into modern thought the use of the French expression "individualité." Thus we find the usages of

scholasticism reaching right down into our life of the present day.

In the course of time, a thoroughgoing change has come about in the significance and position of the individual. The earliest civilisation reveals the individual man as wholly conditioned by his environment. It is not until civilisation has considerably developed that we find the individual asserting himself against the environment and striking out a path of his own. The history of Greek culture shows this with special clearness. In that culture all life and action followed at first fixed custom, fixed use and wont. The rules of tradition were inviolable, the limitations which they imposed were not yet felt as a burden. But as history unfolded itself the individual as such gained strength ever more and more, he became more independent, he began to ask questions regarding the validity of the traditional rules. He felt himself strong enough to doubt and to contest their rights. A point was reached at last at which the individual freed himself from every bond, set up his own opinion as the measure of all truth and his own satisfaction as the goal of all his actions. The effort of Greek genius surmounted for a time the opposition between order and freedom, between subject and object. It was at this point that the high-water mark of Greek creative genius was reached, those achievements which we designate as classical. But,

as commonly happens, the high level was soon left behind, soon the subject vindicated its superiority and the individual became the main co-efficient in life. What disorders and perplexities thereby arose can be seen in the history of the sophists. We cannot escape the conclusion that an evolution in this direction means an inner impoverishment of life. Antiquity, however, did not fall a victim to such a disintegration without a struggle. Thinkers of the very first rank made, with heroic power and penetrating effort, an attempt to overcome the danger. Plato propounded an all-embracing ideal of life which argued the proper form and place of human society from the general scheme of the Universe and gave value to the individual only within the order of the Whole. To him the concept of order and law took precedence over that of individual liberty. Aristotle allowed greater value to the individual, but to him also it was axiomatic that the whole transcends its parts. He is the originator of the tendency to regard the state as prior to the individual citizen. He was convinced that man can only develop his rational faculties in his common life with the Whole. Within that Whole, however, each single unit must as far as possible retain his special vocation. At this point the so-called organic conception of society takes its rise, the doctrine which transfers to human society the conception of the living natural body and its

members. The expression "organic," however, for this doctrine did not come into general use before the close of the eighteenth century. This organic theory seemed peculiarly fitted to unite in one the interests of the community and those of the individual. Each single member seemed to gain in worth to the Whole in proportion to the speciality and peculiarity of its own characteristics. The body of the Whole grew with the differentiation of the members.

But all the efforts of thinkers could not prevent the vital movement from passing more and more exclusively to the side of the individual. Individuals formed for themselves their own coteries and vindicated for themselves an ever larger space in the social world. The relations also of individuals one to another constantly grew in breadth and value. The private life of the individual citizen became the main sphere of his activity. But just because the individual was increasingly thrown more and more upon his own resources, upon *himself*, the demand became urgent that each unit should be given a fixed standing place in the world of thought and a goal transcending his own life. It is the merit of the Stoic philosophy that it ensured to man, in the universal Reason, just such a standing place, and developed with energy the consequences of this teaching. Henceforth the Universe itself was regarded as organic. Not only was the closeness of the

union of the parts to the whole universe zealously proclaimed but also the uniqueness of each several part. The Stoics taught that, even in the smallest things, there can never be found two exactly alike,—not two hairs, or two grains of corn, or two leaves of a tree are completely identical. Later antiquity entertained with special pleasure the thought that no single thing was a mere *part*, that each was a *member*, of the Universe—"I am a member of the Universe of rational Being"—this conviction brought comfort to the noble Emperor Marcus Aurelius in the face of life's cares and perplexities.

B. Christendom.

The metaphor of the organic body makes its appearance on Christian territory in the parable of the Vine and the Branches, given in the fifteenth Chapter of S. John's Gospel. It is found again in a still more definite form in 1 Corinthians, Chapter 12. In proportion as *community* won for itself in the Church an increasingly visible expression, all Christians felt themselves more and more to be members together of a divinely ordained common life. As century after century passed by the individuals were bound ever more closely thereto. The Church as a *whole* developed far beyond anything that its several members could individually attain unto. It was no human product, but a divine Ordering, having a claim to the unqualified obedi-

ence of each single member. Already in the third century we have that saying of S. Cyprian that no man can have God for his Father who has not the Church for his Mother. The Roman Catholic Church in the Middle Ages and right up to the present day has brought this movement to its complete and logical conclusion. But if the transcendence of the Whole over the individual was accepted as axiomatic, there arose at the same time from this common ground very different social forms which at one time complimenting one another, at another came into conflict. There was an hierarchical type and, in sharp contrast with it, a mystical type. Both of these types can claim the philosophical parenthood of the Greek thinker, Plotinus (204—270 A.D.) Not, however, until they were adopted by Christianity did they acquire an universal and historical significance. The hierarchical type of mind envisaged the Universe as an ascending series of stages upon which the divine life, coming down from above, communicated itself in fixed measure and flow. Each several stage obtained what it had from the one next highest above it. It had to pass on what it received, as a matter of duty, to the stage below. Here, also, every part has its own task to perform, its own peculiar value. All this, however, comes to it only from the Whole and within the Whole. The special writer who most completely developed this train of thought is Dionysius the Areo-

pagite (fifth century). From him it acquired its great influence in the Middle Ages and, indeed, beyond the limits of mediæval times.

Mystical thought acted as a counter movement to this idea of hierarchical order. Mysticism strove to bind the individual soul to God without intermediary, to let it share His Glory. This was impossible without elevating the individual beyond all human environment or ecclesiastical order, without in fact bestowing upon him an inner independence. The Catholic Church defended itself against the dangers which arise from this circumstance in that it permitted approach to mysticism only by the way of ecclesiastical order and rule. Experience, however, has shown that this restriction does not easily meet with success. As early as the beginning of the thirteenth century mystical movements and tendencies take their rise which the Church could combat only with difficulty. At the height of the mediæval period a solution in a certain sense was reached and the individual had a place found for him in the Church's system according to his special rank or grade. The most considerable philosophical contribution on this question was that advanced by Meister Eckhart (*circ.* 1260—1329 A.D.) who composed in the German language treatises and sermons of deep insight and so exercised a most powerful influence. But he, too, towards the close of his life, came into conflict with the Church,

and his writings were condemned. For all that, the mystic path remained a place of refuge whither the life of the soul could flee, and from it also philosophy received many a stimulus of great importance.

Just as the mediæval period was characterised throughout by the subordination of the individual to the Whole and the general arrangement of all social life from that standpoint, so also, corresponding to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the feudal system marked off into clearly defined ranks and orders every kind of social and political activity, and envisaged all that was done by each grade as resultant in it from a superior or suzerain power. In such a social order, the individual members of society stood together in close interdependence, and as mere units could do nothing. Consequently, in that period, the economic life of society was founded upon the conviction that men singly are weak and in need of help. Recognised social bodies such as the guilds and city companies had the task of defending the citizens and of protecting them from harm. Production and consumption were closely inter-related, fixed limits were put to economic competition, to amass unlimited wealth was regarded as an act of injustice. At that period, life from one end to the other moved on circumscribed lines, and regulations of a transcendental order governed all practical activity.

C. The period of transition.

Into this mediæval order, an immense disquiet and disturbance came with the dawn of the fifteenth century. No sphere of life escaped it, its consequences reached out even to the present day. Mediæval regulation was succeeded by an ideal of liberty; after organisation came emancipation, after permanence the impulse to movement and progress. But only gradually was this great change fully accomplished, and in the course of the change many different paths were trod. So also the position of the individual passed through varying phases. The transition period between mediæval and modern times, the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, by no means abandoned all and every traditional vital form. But it put mankind into a more active relationship with all these forms. It gave life greater originality and greater self-dependence. During that period, both the ancient civilisation and Christian tradition alike were still reckoned as an inheritance of unassailable truth. But man had to seek a new way to that truth and therein lay the essential difference that marked the life of the period. Civilisation and religion increased the significance of the individual—it was an aim of the Renaissance to bind the individual more closely to the Universe, and of the Reformation, on the other hand, to make his relationship with

God take a more interior and independent form.

The process of liberating the cultural life of the individual began in Italy. It was there, first of all, that men were appraised, not so much in virtue of belonging to some special social class as on account of their own nature and individual proclivities. No inalienable mark was branded on the individual on account of the family from which he sprung or of his rank in society. Each on the contrary could act as his own tastes dictated and could create in his own way without molestation. Plotinus had already proclaimed an universal Nature, an inner infinity of the human soul. He was inspired by the conviction that each single soul partook immediately in the infinity of the Universe and was so to say a special and peculiar facet of the universal Whole. "Each of us," he said, "is a spiritual world in himself." From this thought of the indwelling of Infinity in each soul the old expression "microcosmus" as used by Democritus and Aristotle acquired a deeper meaning. The separate individual is no mere *part*, but can go in experience through all the fulness of the world. "God is through all in all and all is in God," said Nicholas of Cusa. In his view, the human spirit is a divine seed which carries in itself the archetypes of all things. At this stage the idea of development begins to take on the sense of a progress which, starting with

our own forces, reaches out towards a limitless goal. From Giordano Bruno came the conception of "*monad*," of mutually separated, indivisible, indestructible units. For him, life and death were only different phases of the same essential Being, its evolution and its involution. Thus the individual gains the consciousness of permanence. Thus, for the Renaissance, the individual is the point of departure of all effort, but he is throughout sustained by the Divine Life and must not be sundered therefrom. Man here finds his proper task in the full development of the Life which surrounds us in all its power and beauty. Moral effort, however, and its difficult problems remain in the background. A speculative and artistic treatment of the Universe dominates everything, promising to raise human life into spaciousness and liberty.

The Reformation gives us a view of the individual essentially different from this. Here the dominant tone is no longer that of intellect or art but of morals. It was moral scorn that first gave Luther his impulse towards Reformation. The occasion of the traffic in indulgences, as the matter developed, opened up entirely new vistas into the world of ethics and personal worth. First and foremost there was the soul to be saved; for that there was no need of any human mediation. The soul's salvation can come only from God immediately, and can manifest itself only by an inner renewing of the man himself. To-

gether with that, freedom from the incubus of outward works and from the precepts of men is fully secured. "All works and all things," said Luther, "are free to a Christian man by reason of his faith." Here, accordingly, it is the moral and religious personality which demands and acquires freedom, the Church falls into the second place. But it would be wrong to put the essence of the Reformation in the efforts and ideas of the mere individual. The Reformation demanded also an ideal of life independent of individual caprice, and if the movement allowed greater self-determination to the individual, that was done upon the assumption of a truth that entirely transcended him. It was not until the eighteenth century that the more subjective view was taken up into Protestant thought. At the same time it is not to be denied that different tendencies are to be found within the Reformation movement; for instance, the Lutheran type of personal piety and also the Lutheran idea of freedom are quite other than what is found among the followers of Calvin. Alongside of these, the several Protestant denominations present manifold variations.

D. Modern times.

(a) The period of the "Enlightenment."

We have traced throughout the centuries many changes in the relationship of the individual to society. From the commencement

of the modern period, however, certain fundamentally different ways of thinking on this question can be distinguished. The more modern way has put its chief emphasis on man in the sense of the individual. This epoch has found its highest achievements in the pursuit of this thought and has, at the same time, found itself involved in problems of the greatest difficulty.

The most important change was introduced by the Enlightenment, starting from the beginning of the seventeenth century. In this movement France and England led the way. Germany was so weakened and distressed by the horrors of the Thirty Years' War that it was unable to take a share with all its forces in that cultural movement.

The Enlightenment began by busying itself with the great problems of the Universe, but very soon took in hand questions of sociology. In this department England led the way. In his own fashion Hobbes attempted to explain the life of man in society—he held that it resulted from, on the one hand, the natural fact that men must live side by side and, on the other, from the inevitable clash of their private and personal interests. But no considerable effect on political relationships was reached by this treatment of the problem. Locke, on the contrary, exercised a very powerful influence, he held up to mankind a new social ideal and therewith bestowed on the individual an un-

controvertible transcendence. The effect of his thought was heightened by his clear and limpid literary style. True, he advanced only single aperçus and gave no systematised philosophy, but all that he teaches rests upon a fundamental root-conviction which has remained the basis of modern scientific liberalism.

Locke developed the common life of politics and of society entirely out of the individuals as the *given* and clearly tangible elements. The older conception of an organism existing prior to the individuals which it embraces and unifies was rejected as confusing and misleading. Locke's system, however, unlike that of Hobbes, represented man in his social groups, not as a mere product of nature, but as a personality endowed with reason. The essence of reason, however, was made to consist in the capacity of reflecting, of making an independent decision and of remaining loyal to it when made. This implies a considerable change of view when compared with the older idea. The older way of thinking saw in reason, first and foremost, the faculty of arriving at general ideas and of subsuming under them all the single phenomena. Locke, on the contrary, puts first the power of independent action, the ability to come to a decision of one's own.

Here the modern conception of society begins; it is thought of as a free association

of individuals, a fellowship of independent elements. From this basis and none other the state is deduced. It is an association of a particular kind, existing for a special end. It has limited tasks to perform and clearly drawn frontiers to keep. Its principal duty is to protect the rights of individuals in person and chattels against attempted injury from outside. In order to secure life's full power and "truth," it seems necessary to keep the state within narrow limits and to leave to the individuals and to the associations which they freely form as much liberty as possible. In this way the Anglo-Saxon genius created the modern state on the basis of right and freedom in marked contrast to the state of the Renaissance whose ends were strength and its own type of civilisation.

In this sphere the life of the state cannot be satisfied with mere brute fact, it refuses to recognise authority simply because it has force at its command. On the contrary, all justification must come from reason alone, only what reason declares to be right has power to bind in conscience human activities.

The State's right can be based only upon the good that it accomplishes in the living present. It is this conception of Right and this alone which can regulate the standing of the individual in the common social life. No authority can enforce its claim in the face of reason.

But Locke was far from drawing the full

consequences from his theory. Had he done so, he would have been compelled to abandon all historical tradition and everything inherited from the past. This he was not prepared to do. The traditional, historical bases of society are silently treated as rationally justified. The idea is merely to improve the present state of things in details, the aim is not revolution, but reform. The whole is illumined by sober, reasonable thought. It is also worthy of note that Locke saw in the habits and the customs that are manifested in social life a certain kind of balance to political freedom. It is important again to notice that he gives public opinion a third place, side by side with divine law and state law. In that—i.e., in public opinion—he saw a trustworthy safeguard for truth.

If we take a comprehensive survey of this phase of thought, we cannot fail to notice the great contrast it presents to the thought of earlier times and in particular to that of the Middle Ages. The earlier types looked upon the individual as weak and needing help, especially in his daily work and his trade. The Enlightenment, on the other hand, had confidence in man's native power and goodness and believed him fully capable of dealing with the problems of full-grown life for himself. The sense of difficult interior perplexities was foreign to the thought of that period. And the case was just the same with the economic as with the political move-

ment. In the Middle Ages, economic life was absolutely and entirely subordinated to the claims of morals and religion. The struggle to obtain material goods seemed to that age something, if not quite despicable, at any rate on an altogether lower level. That attitude broke down at the Renaissance and the Enlightenment brought economic life to its full development. Important elements in this process were the formation in the Netherlands and in England of ever larger associations for the furtherance of trade and the great influence which those associations acquired. Nor was there any lack of theories about the implication of economic activity. The Mercantile School treated economics as just a means for enhancing the power of the State and when the Physiocrats on the other hand strove to base economic life directly upon Nature, they were nevertheless unable to attain to a consistent system. Such a system was, however, the creation of Adam Smith. He it was who secured for the Enlightenment a complete domination in the economic sphere. His strength lay in the clarity, simplicity and conclusiveness of his thought. He starts with the fact of the division of labour, to him this was the chief means whereby a culture could be built up. From this basis he sketches out a remarkable picture of human social life. He is convinced that division of labour so far from causing any divorce between the

various elements, binds them, in fact, more closely together. Each single member of the whole, as a condition of keeping itself in being, must be in some way productive, but that involves producing for the other members something which is of service or of value to them. Thus without any question of external compulsion men are closely linked each to other and everyone has the strongest possible motive to employ his forces to the full and to bring them to their maximum power. As regards, however, the question of what actually is useful the individual is himself the best judge, he is in no need of supervision by the police or any other such body—the most effective of all controls is exercised by the customers who buy from him. On such lines the closely connected system of natural freedom is elaborated. Let each “pursue his own interest in his own way.” This system has the advantage in that, on the one hand, every individual uses his own powers to the full for his own interest, while, on the other hand, he is at the same time furthering the good of all in the most effective manner. The result will be that social life is directed to its proper ends without such ends being consciously before the individuals at all. Here rivalry and competition are reckoned to be *par excellence* the great motives of progress. Faith in the potency of elementary natural impulses is firmly held. Individual interests

are believed to be the most powerful motive forces and the surest guarantee of success. The system throughout assumes, in the producer, ability to deliver his goods and also discriminating judgment on the part of the consumer—an assumption of great optimism. It is surely noteworthy that in this system there is no recognition of any inner joy in the work or of any inner development in human life. All effort is directed only to increase the worker's economic importance, acquisition and gain are accounted Life's dominant forces. But when we give the fullest recognition to these limitations of Adam Smith's doctrine, we must also, at the same time, admit that his achievement has removed many obstacles in the way of economic life and has vivified in a marvellous way latent economic forces. The weak point of his teaching lies in its claim to dominate the whole of life.

The manner in which the French Enlightenment treated the relation of individual and society differed essentially from the foregoing. In England, this movement had built itself up on the basis of historical matter of fact. France, on the contrary, was completely under the influence of the unhistorical and indefensible conditions which prevailed in that country. The desire for reform was more and more driven into the path of revolution. Here the Enlightenment found its principal task to be to secure spiritual and

political liberty. It had, before all things, to free mankind from a yoke of injustice and from crippling superstition and thereby to lead the way to the full expansion of human powers. The dominating thought all along was a firm faith in man's moral sentiments and in his spiritual capabilities. It was only the evil conditions of contemporary social life that bore the guilt of the discontent of which the times were sick unto death. Thus all political and historical occurrences were freed at once from all authority and from every supernatural tie. The individual was conscious that he stood in abrupt opposition to his environment, all the more, therefore, did he trust his own capacity and strength.

Rousseau especially gave a powerful impulse to the movement which took its rise in these conditions. He exalted feeling, in its immediacy, to be the central thing in life. From this standpoint of feeling he metamorphosised every sphere of life, especially Religion, Politics and Education. Each one of them he brought back to the individual as to life's original source. This brought him into passionate conflict with the traditional social order; he saw therein not only this or that mistake or defect, but he rejected contemporary society *en bloc* and demanded in its place a new life fresher and truer than the old and capable of bringing a new social order into being. Here, first individual and society engage in uncompromising conflict,

here first the movement sweeps into itself the whole of life and thought. The result was a mighty rejuvenation and renovation of existence for all Europe. But there was still many a problem left and much that was obscure. The relationship between the individual and the state especially presented itself in a remarkable form. Rousseau desired to deduce all social order from the individual, but he completed here a curious *volte-face*, in proclaiming a sort of "social ego," a collective Whole. To this Whole each single member of the state is to surrender his rights. The Whole thereby acquires unlimited power. Henceforth the chief task of the state is no longer to secure the protection and the prosperity of the individuals composing it, as the English writers held, but the Good of the Whole, its general welfare. A heavy handicap is thereby laid on the freedom of the individuals, we have a freedom only *within* the state but no independence of personality over against the state. There is no appeal here to individual conviction or to individual conscience. What we find is a state omnipotence in democratic guise. Such a power can easily develop into complete tyranny, as has indeed been proved in the later phases of the French Revolution. It is clear that the Germanic and the Romance ideas of freedom here part sharply asunder. The Germanic idea rests on personal independence while the Romance or

Latin conception is prepared to sacrifice unconditionally all personal independence to the Will of the Whole. The majority of votes decided between good and evil.

The specially characteristic mark of Rousseau's thought is the abrupt opposition between the natural goodness of the individual and the evil condition of actually existing society. All that is good comes from the individuals, all that is bad from corrupt society—it was more than anything else the abruptness of this opposition that made Rousseau the spiritual leader of the French Revolution. But political and socialistic radicalism works at all times in exactly the same direction, boundless faith in the individual, boundless mistrust of the actual historical relationships.

(b.) German Idealism.

German idealism has taken up an attitude of its own in regard to the problem of individual and society. To favour the individual in a marked degree is natural to the German mind. The German would wish to bring to full development not only the peculiarities of individual men but those also of the smaller social groups. From of old he has had the inclination to follow only leaders of his own choice but, when he has found such leaders, to give his whole conviction and soul to the duties involved in the relationship. Hence has loyalty to the

person of the leader seemed always one of the most important things in life. The constant and increasing tendency of the German nation throughout its history to break up into political fragments has prevented the emergence of a powerful common will. The Reformation indeed brought about a mighty liberation of soul, but it split political life into still more fragments. The German mind created for itself a sanctuary of feeling and faith. Thus it could indeed transcend hindrances and cares, but not by such means could it bring about the formation of a common will or establish an independent society. All the more did the German genius strive to achieve an interior universal standpoint within the soul from which to order all life in its own special way. All those inner provinces of life such as Religion, Philosophy, Education and also Music and Poetry opened up new depths of reality in the soul. Here spiritual creation was the soul's conflict with the infinity of the Universe. It was not sufficient here to describe or to set in order a merely given world, rather, a new world had to be created. Minds of great eminence have applied themselves to undertake this work and have thereby greatly enriched our common life. Such an one was Leibniz with his theory of monads. For him, interior forces, beings of the nature of souls, constitute the groundwork of all reality. Souls and bodies are not

parallel phenomena but are related as Essence and Appearance. It is held that each monad through its own development engenders within itself as *Representation* what exist outside of it as Reality. Thus, for example, the actual state of the sun will exactly correspond to the image of it formed interiorly. This is assuredly an audacious, even a deceptive hypothesis but behind it lies a powerful delineation of human life. According to Leibniz we are no mere *points*, but each of us is an universe within an all-embracing Universe. "Man," he said, "is not a part but the very image of Deity, a little picture of the Universe, a citizen of the City of God." . . . "In our self-existence an infinity lies hid, a footprint of the Divine, an image of God's omnipotence and omniscience." A special conception of freedom also results from this, it draws its being from the very sources of life. This essential freedom is clearly distinguished from political liberty which is concerned with the relationship of one man towards another. But essential freedom to the mind of Leibniz comes in the first place, the attitude of man to the Universe is the decisive factor of all.

Kant followed still further in the same direction. Up to his time modern thought had started with the individual, English philosophers especially had brought the necessary psychological enquiries to great perfection. But Kant opposed to this method

one that was new, which he called transcendental but which we can better describe as noological. According to this view, the real subject of life is not the individual taken by himself, but the spiritual structure of life generally. It is indeed a vital power surpassing the limits of any individual and shedding new light on every part of life. The movement proceeds, not as with the Enlightenment, from separate points but from a spiritual Whole. We should not speak so much of a kingdom of minds or spirits, as if these were separate or individual, but rather of a spiritual World.

From this spiritual World every department of life must develop itself, with it each must make its account. This is the root of the type of historical and social thought that dominated the nineteenth century. This uplifting of life beyond mere points assures for man an interior independence, it establishes not merely a freedom for separated individuals, but a kingdom of ethical freedom. This conception of life was energetically worked out by Kant's successors, they planned out all the various provinces in their several ways, but amid all the manifold differences which marked this world of thought, they emphasised the transcendence of a common life of the Whole above and beyond the mere individual. Hegel especially has an unquestionable pre-eminence in this region. Throughout his philosophy the

Whole is given priority over the single parts and he consistently raises the state high over the individual. He does indeed find the essence of the modern state in the fact that the Whole is therein bound up with the full liberty, the unique character and the prosperity of the *individual* member, but high above all of them the Whole remains in unconditioned transcendence. State and Society are plainly distinguished. In the State the dominant factor is the organised Common Will of the people, Society is constituted by the mutual relationships of the individual units. At the same time Hegel is thoroughly convinced that no great achievement is a mere product of the mass or the crowd but is the work of some individual mind of uncommon quality. But, according to his theory, such remarkable individuals can never claim a real or peculiar independence of their own as against their own time. It is their time that has engendered them, and in what they do they are only bringing into clear consciousness that which is struggling for expression in the common social life. "In public opinion," he says, "is at once all that is true and all that is false, but the province of the great man is to find out that element of truth. He is the great man of any epoch who proclaims the message and meaning of his time, tells it to his contemporaries and brings it to fulfilment." In the utterance of such a sentiment Hegel con-

fesses his firm faith in the sway of reason in history. To-day we should not meet the question with so much confidence.

There can, however, be no doubt that just at this point the philosopher gives expression to a fact which the movement of the time had forced upon his notice. At that period from many different sides the individual and associations of individuals were being forced into the background and more powerful and more permanent social systems were in demand. The creation of national unities contributed to this result, as did a more profound study of the history of the various peoples. Another cause was the technical, scientific basis upon which common life was now being built, binding as it did isolated forces in closer union, and theory also helped in the same direction in that it elevated the idea of the state far above the capabilities or the conscious ends of the individual citizens. But the changed attitude was first made fully comprehensible through the rise of social democracy with which we shall have to deal at a later stage.

If we contemplate in its entirety the German contribution to these problems, we are at once aware that it constitutes a great dividing line in the world of thought. German life had raised itself to a proud height by the elaboration of an independent spiritual world of its own. But this life was endangered on the one side by the consideration

that only a spiritual aristocracy had part or lot in its greatness while the great mass of the people were hardly at all touched by it, with the result that from those intellectual heights the contradictions of actual experience were rated all too low. It was held that all hindrances could be quickly overcome and yet the conclusion forced itself upon men that in this matter great perplexities remained. In short, Germany experienced a powerful recoil against idealism and the idealistic solution of the problem of the individual and society. In the earlier stage life's central point was spiritual creation in Art, Literature and Philosophy, the world of thought was the home of educated men. But now it was necessary to deal far more closely with the immediate environment in all its phases and with social problems of all kinds. This movement was not limited to Germany. The whole commonwealth of culture shared the effort to comprehend the world of the senses with greater precision and to dominate it more freely. Germany, however, experienced the change of direction with greater abruptness. If in the past poets and thinkers had been the nation's leaders, scientists and engineers were soon to step into their place.

(c.) Modern Realism.

aa. Positivism.

Realism, with its trend towards the world

that lies nearest, is not the creation of a moment. At all times the invisible universe of idealism has met with a tenacious resistance from the average man everywhere. In earlier times this resistance remained mere opposition and nothing more. In the modern period, however, it has produced a philosophy of its own and has, accordingly, treated every department of thought from its own standpoint. Natural science and social activities have been the chief spheres where this new view has been most *en evidence*. Realism stood for a decisive negation of any supersensuous world such as is offered to us in religion and metaphysics. In contradistinction from them, it directs its energies exclusively to the realm of experience, in the belief, however, of being able to bestow upon experience a far richer and more valuable content. The scientific bases of this realism reach back into the eighteenth century, Hume especially has had much influence in this direction. But not until Comte published his "Positive Philosophy" was a consistent system created. This is the origin of the expression "Positivism." Positivism, then, treated the concepts of individual and society in a way of its own. In this system the individual can claim no interior independence. Outwardly and inwardly alike he is completely bound up with his environment. One of the chief doctrines of this school is the unconditional dependence of man upon

his social surroundings, the doctrine of the "milieu," as it is called. The term "milieu" was first given a technical sense by the naturalist Lamarck. Comte transferred it from zoology to social science. Taine employed the term with special predilection, and from these beginnings the word acquired a wide fashionable vogue. According to this theory man is dominated even in his inmost desires and dreams by that which comes to him from his social environment. Even a conflict between the individual and the environment has, they tell us, its deepest roots in the needs of the Whole, within which, indeed, it is entirely contained. Concomitantly the conception of the social average, of the mean, or ordinary man, comes to the forefront. The fact is emphasised that the physical differences between individuals, so far as they can be measured, lie within far narrower limits than is commonly supposed, and the presumption is ventured that the life of the soul can be understood on similar lines—hence we have the "moral statistic" popularised by Quetelet. From the same ideas many remarkable motives for social betterment take their rise. Even crime now appears not so much as the guilty acts of individuals but rather as the consequence of bad social arrangements. Such a conviction gives a most powerful impulse towards the amelioration of social relationships, towards a kindlier application of the law,

towards a raising of the standard of life. And herewith Comte gives a new significance to the old concept of organism. It has no longer anything to do with the inner life of a single unitary principle which pervades all the members, but appears as the meshes of a web woven out of just these single elements. The elements are bereft of any interior life of their own but they are knit together and entwined so closely together that what any one of them does or suffers, its pleasure or its pain, affects immediately all the others. In this matter Comte appeals to the historical investigations of such writers as Bichat. The modern division of labour, also, shows him how completely the single member is bound up with the Whole. In all this we come across important and fruitful thoughts, but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that the doctrine suffers from an inner contradiction. It treats the whole actual world as a process in nature wherein all that happens comes into being by sheer necessity. Scientific investigation is accordingly reduced to mere description, the simple recording of actual fact. But the thinker finds the condition of society so unsatisfactory that it compels him to set before it new ends for it to attain. Thus he who sets out merely to describe finds himself impelled to reform. So, by manifold influences from St. Simon, Comte is convinced that modern civilised life is thoroughly unsatisfying. It falls to pieces

as a number of merely separate intentions and efforts. There is nothing to act as a ceaseless counter influence to individual selfishness, to the excessive valuation of merely material interests, to political corruption. There is a lack of unifying ideas. It is a world of half-convictions and half-will. Life becomes mean and poor, the satellite of the mean outlook and of the superficial impression. Now the effort before positivism is to raise these miserable conditions of life to altogether higher levels, but this it cannot do without a call upon the energies of the individual and an attempt to bring about a revolutionary change. That implies, however, an altogether different relationship of the individual to his environment, it bestows upon him far more independence and originality. The actual world is no longer just a process of nature and no more, but becomes a sphere wherein ethical forces are a necessity and where lofty ideals can be described. This contradiction is not limited to positivism, it extends to all the various forms of realism. On the one hand, faith is professed in an order of natural law which can find no place for freedom, on the other hand life's various relationships are subjected to a severe criticism and the effort is constantly made to attain to essentially higher levels of life.

bb. Socialism.

Socialism and Positivism have their terri-

tory in common, they both place themselves exclusviely within the world of experience and both purport to exercise their influence within its limits alone. But beyond this they pursue entirely different ends. Positivism assigns to each single unit within a specified order a certain definite place and gives him a definite task to perform. While the individual man is engaged in the full development of his own personal powers, he is at the same time furthering the interests of the transcendent Whole. In positivism we are concerned with a carefully thought-out ordering of society, not with a revolution. Socialism, on the contrary, sees in society as it now is an intolerable evil which impels it to the passionate advocacy of a new social order altogether. The point of departure of all its effort is the essentially changed character of work as it now dominates modern life. In earlier times work was closely bound up with individual personality. Each several worker had his own special field of labour and his own peculiar joy in his task. But now all that has changed *de fond en comble* by reason of the modern grip of machinery upon labour, which commenced in the second half of the eighteenth century and is now-a-days the leading force in our lives. The forces of nature, with the help of machinery, must now act in entire subservience to human ends. This fact has produced immensely complex systems of mechanical production where the

efforts of the single worker count for just nothing at all. With the factories, the abrupt opposition of Capital and Labour has come into being. The capitalist has all the appearance of an absolute master while the workers have been herded together in masses in our great modern cities. Such a congestion of workers, however, has inevitably given rise to a heightened self-consciousness and a desire for greater power. Humanity cannot for long acquiesce in being treated as a mere means or tool. Men are ever impelled to demand a recognition of their independence and of their human value. Socialism, however, is convinced that such ideals cannot be attained by a quiet and steady development. They demand a complete revolution, a revolution destined to alter the centre of gravity of the whole body and of its organisation. Concurrently great changes are being accomplished in the relationship between man and society. By means of organisation the erstwhile defenceless individual is being endowed with new strength and altogether lifted above himself. In close connection with this is the insistent demand for the socialisation of work. The worker is to be, no longer a servant, but a master of his work, which he will henceforth treat as something of his own and he will begin to feel joy in it. The impersonal character of work, again, though it cannot be entirely removed, may be reduced and made

less absolute if every thought is directed to the common end for which work is done, the attainment of which will bring with it the elevation of the worker himself. In close connection with this altered view of work stands the attempt to lessen as far as may be, the differences which divide one individual from another. The classes and class privileges hitherto recognised in society are felt to be an injustice, and there is an attempt to bring about greater equality in all the relationships of life. All these taken together result in a new idea of social life which promises to bring the individual and society together in a fuller harmony.

But however fascinating at first glance this representation appears to be, it contains problems of the greatest perplexity. Socialism puts right in the forefront society as a whole, but it does not recognise society to be an intrinsic whole at all, it endows it with no transcendent unity. On the contrary, society for socialism means just mere collocation, a mere sum of separate entities. No common life of the whole is ever attained, no inner union of souls. The socialisation therefore which it seeks to bring about, never results in an interior fellowship. However much organised, life never achieves a soul. There are no spiritual forces able to dominate the promiscuous elements or thoroughly to break down individual egoisms. The "equality" also at which it aims,

abounds in perplexities. The original kernel of the idea of equality lay in the thought of God. If this thought be invalidated or abandoned, we are brought up face to face with the fact that men are altogether unequal one with another. Both nature and civilisation conspire to increase this inequality more and more. The contradiction could only be countered if humanity could bring to pass in nature and civilisation alike a complete equality of all men and of all relationships. That, if thought out to its logical conclusion, would result in communism pure and simple, as Babeuf saw long ago. But there cannot be any doubt that, with this result, not only would all personal freedom be destroyed, but all spiritual culture as well. Fundamentally, socialism means the domination of mere *quantity*; it holds that an essentially higher stage of life can be attained by a mere adding together of forces. In actual truth, Reason is no mere summation, and the individual would lose the most powerful incentives to efficiency if he had to give up all thought of raising himself above the level of his neighbours. Socialism puts forth a picture of human nature quite other than could be justified on its own principles. It bedecks man in his natural state with qualities of great excellence and overlooks the fact that such an ennobling of human nature is simply and solely the effect of toilsome work and education by means of religion and civilisation.

We saw that positivism and socialism, in the realisation of their several aims, parted wide asunder, but they have a common weakness—they can give to human life no independent interior soul and no elevating goal. The limitations of these systems become evident with perfect clarity if, in each case, we take a wide survey of life as a whole and ask, What, from this point of view, does it mean? It is significant in this connection that the leading thinkers of the realistic school themselves, men like Comte, Mill and Spencer, could find no complete satisfaction in the systems they set up. This relative failure drove Comte to an intellectual *volte-face*. Mill and Spencer felt the unsolved riddle of the universe as a haunting question and their attitude towards religion became less negative in consequence. Wherever the life of the soul, with its exigencies and its perplexities, is really understood, there neither positivism nor socialism can achieve a satisfactory relationship between the individual and society. The individual never attains any true essential being at all and can never construct for himself a real home in life, nor can society find a soul to penetrate it throughout and to elevate it.

(d.) Subjectivism.

The more the realistic school of thought was characterised by such limitations as these, the greater was the temptation to cut

the individual loose entirely from all ties to his surroundings and, as far as possible, to throw him back upon his own resources. This reaction against realism brought into being the movement which may be described by the term "subjectivism." Both these phases of thought agree together in so far as they recognise no actuality beyond what can be perceived by the senses and limit all human endeavour to that sphere. Both agree in rejecting all religion and all metaphysic. But within the boundaries thus laid down, either is the absolute contrary of the other. Realism fabricates its world out of the objects of sensation and nothing more, subjectivism, on the other hand, concerns itself entirely with the interior mental state, with mere feeling, unrestrained and floating free. The result is a very peculiar presentment of life, and a peculiar relationship between individual and society. All effort is now directed to the one end of elevating the individual to the highest possible degree. Environment becomes a mere means to this end. With this emphasis on subjective disposition, life resolves itself into a ceaseless flux. That which is peculiar, unique, differentiating, is brought into special prominence. The immediate moment is seized upon and tasted with avidity. The life of the spirit finds its chief fulfilment in artistic and literary creation. But such creation is at the same time marked with characteristics of great

onesidedness. The impulsive subjective movement takes precedence over the object created, the colour means more than the drawing, lyric is of higher value than dramatic poetry, the whole world of thought peters out into stray aphorisms.

The whole of this movement, obviously, is a reaction against realism, an attempt to resist its shallow and soulless presentment of human life. While, however, it is certainly true that much has been done by this movement in the direction of animating and stimulating life, the movement of subjectivism is in no position to bestow upon life a real content or a true system. It decomposes the soul into mere isolated moments whose many and various alternations may indeed arouse and excite, but the end must inevitably be emptiness. Furthermore, this subjectivism is compelled to deal with society and its cohesion in a wrong manner. Its professors are wont to find themselves constantly in opposition to other people and overlook the fact that Paradox implies only an indirect dependence upon others and upon society in general. A real interior independence and true human worth are not to be attained by this method.

If we cast our thoughts upon the influences brought to bear upon us by the world immediately before us, we are at once conscious of great opposition and crude contradiction. We men find ourselves enveloped in a world

of nature to which we cannot set limits, it is mysterious and seems quite indifferent to our weal or woe. In the face of the mighty forces of the universe man's whole ambit sinks to an evanescent pettiness. If, to escape from this prospect of ruin, man turns himself to the social life of his kind, he finds it just a mere collocation of single forces which possess no power to create an interior elevation of life. Or if, again, he take refuge within himself in order to set against the world without him an interior world within, the conclusion is forced upon him that here too life evaporates in single isolated points. All these things awaken within him a serious doubt as to the meaning and value of human nature altogether. He turned to the world of the senses in the hope that here humanity would find the fulfilment of all its desires, but now manifold opposition stands in his path. Above all, he is unable to find any true relationship between individual and society. He flits from one point to another, but nowhere can he find a life wherein the individual and society are reconciled. Thus do we see to-day that perplexity has planted itself in the deepest ground of our life and being.

II.—THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY AT THE PRESENT DAY.

WE have seen that the historical movement has at the present time resulted in a crude contradiction. It will, accordingly, be for us an urgent task to discuss what contribution our age is capable of giving towards the solution of this problem. With this in view we shall have to discuss the deeper bases of the relationship which we are examining and then proceed to inquire into those relevant movements which are manifest in the collective life.

A. Life's Fundamental Characteristics.

It is not open to doubt that in mankind many different grades of being, of different values, meet together. On one side we are bound to the world of nature, on the other hand, humanity is the place where a life of self-conscious independence takes its origin. The development of this opposition produces the contrast between the world of the merely "given" and the world of action. The "given" embraces us as some inevitable fate; it is only by our own exertions that we can become participators in a world of action. In each of these different worlds the relation-

ship between individual and society has a distinctive form which is not found in the other. The natural world of the "given" treats individuals as mere isolated points which do indeed have many inter-relations among themselves but never attain to a *Whole* wherein the several points are transcended. An independent world of thought is out of the question. Life can rise no higher than the isolated sensation and the isolated impulse. The life of the spirit on the contrary with its world of action entirely changes the outlook. From the inter-action of the isolated points an Unity rises into being and gives to life from end to end a distinctive character. Spiritual powers and values come into being which far surpass the motives of merely natural self-preservation. Instead of bare relationship, a *real content* is secured, life (one may say) fulfils itself in a true reality. Action no longer follows blind compulsion but is such as can result from an independent will. This is most clearly seen in the sphere of ethics. In that sphere, effort becomes liberated from what is merely individual. It becomes possible to conceive of other men and of the totality of society as something of our very own, and to make their interests identical with ours. It is also to be remarked that in ethics all ends claim for themselves an absolute value, and present themselves as with the authority of entirely unconditional

claims, while other ends possess conditional value only. Law and justice, again, imply a special relationship between individual and society. The purpose of law is to secure the independence of a free being, but the relationships of free beings imply as their presupposition a transcendental realm of justice and a transcendently just will. Thus the single citizen, however individuated, remains always subject to the common will of all. In the interest of freedom itself, limits are prescribed for him which he may not pass. So, as the life of the spirit comes into the forefront, the relationship of individual to society is put upon a new base.

This, however, may be very differently pictured and very differently elucidated. We have seen how wide apart on this question are the positions of ancient and modern thought respectively. The type of thought to which we gave the name organic, followed a far different method from that of mechanism. To organic thought the Whole has precedence over the individuals that compose it. Its foremost concern is to secure the cohesion of society. The individual is here entirely defined in terms of the common social order. We have seen how this was the characteristic type of ancient and mediæval thought and how, owing to the historical and romantic movement it has been again revived. It has even to-day many adherents. But although this way of looking

at the problem has the advantage of grasping the transcendence of the Whole, it is, nevertheless, open to attack in so far as it sees in the individual no more than a mere part of the Whole and fails to treat him as an independent centre. The general order which it envisages threatens to suppress human liberty. At the opposite extreme, the mechanical method champions the transcendence of the individual and of his freedom; to it, organisation is a sequel to or consequence of the emancipation of the separate forces. The strength of this method is to be found in its power to rouse all the forces of the individual and to give them the widest scope and the freest activity. But it is a hard task, on this basis, to arrive at any interior cohesion; the danger is never far away that the various ends of the separate units might tear life as a whole into shreds between them, and thus empty life of its content. To make any progress on these lines one had to assume that in each separate element there is an innate Reason. Thus, indeed, it was possible to attain cohesion, but no sufficient ground for the cohesion could be assigned. No proper distinction was possible between the concepts of natural and spiritual life. Over against this contention between the organic and the mechanical schools, the attempt began to be made to set forth the relation between society and the individual in such a way that the individual, as a reasonable

being, might claim an immediate interest in the intellectual and spiritual life of the Whole. To achieve this, however, a conception of the individual far above that of the ordinary definitions is required,—he must be endowed with an inner infinitude. Such a conception was long ago suggested by Plotinus, and this idea is to be found in the periods that followed, just off the main stream of thought. But to give it its proper importance has been the work of modern philosophy. It has been especially the great German thinkers who have given us from this point of view an outlook on life all their own. Actuality is here seen to be a macrocosm of independent universes. From this there arises a new orientation of life, a thorough-going, comprehensive effort to integrate the life of each separate element and the life of the Whole. Thus, for example, science comes to be thought of, not as a piecing together of isolated facts, but as a product of the *Whole*, whereupon it must for ever be based. But the soul of the thinker equally has a right to embrace the Whole as its own and to achieve thereby an inner uplifting. To adopt this standpoint of thought means to overcome the opposition of Freedom and Order. The Whole must indeed come first, and give cohesion to the separate elements. But the individual element can, with the Whole, rise to freedom. In the very concept of freedom we are bound to recognise immediately a common universal

life. Thus, too, the deeper religious insight does not treat human freedom and divine grace as contradictories, but sees that freedom can only be understood as the effect of grace. By means of the Whole, life acquires a sure transcendence over the opposition of organic and mechanical. We may set this concept of autonomy over against the other two. By it alone we are enabled to recognise at once the true meaning and the limits of the other concepts. It is indeed true that autonomy is found within experience as an ideal concept only to which we may approach but gradually and from many different sides, but it must ever remain the goal of all our striving.

B. The Experiences and Complexities in the General Historical Movement.

a. Perplexities and struggles.

In treating of these matters we must ever keep before our eyes the fact that our universe can never be thought of as a complete or closed system. It is, on the contrary, in the process of becoming. And we must also recognise that this "becoming" is not a peaceful and steady development, smoothly working itself out, but rather a development that has to meet on all sides obstacles and perplexities. This interplay of evolution and involution cannot fail to make many differences to the relationship of individual and society. Our universe is a battlefield from

end to end. We have to wage war in every direction, first against nature, secondly in the relationship in which one man stands towards another, and thirdly in the problem of the spiritual life. At each stage the relationship of individual to society assumes a special shape.

1. *The battle against Nature.* The necessity of keeping our bodies alive impels us to a fight with nature. In this fight man stands in need of his brother man, a certain degree of combination in a common life is absolutely necessary. But the development of a fixed social order out of this battle with nature has been only a very gradual process. Here the modern period marks a new epoch. Earlier periods conceived our dependence upon nature as an ordering of fate, which man could do nothing but put up with. But to-day a new situation has been brought into being by reason of the common results of natural science and of the technical power at its disposal and also by the enhancement of social activity. Take the case of science. In earlier times science was something that anyone might presume to take in hand. It was possible for Aristotle and even for Leibniz to suppose that they had made themselves masters of its whole range. To-day, on the contrary, science has grown ever more and more beyond the compass of any individual. Science is a force standing upon its own independent base and setting the pace of its own

advancement. Bacon long ago clearly recognised this independence when he expressed himself in the words "Multi pertransibunt et augebitur scientia." From the fact that the spiritual movement which carries on the progress of science is one which far transcends the individual worker, a very special relation of individual and society necessarily follows. The execution of the work remains with the individuals singly, but it is the collective life which unifies and directs their efforts. Effort, however closely bound up with the Whole, is here free and independent in each several instance, but far otherwise is the case when a close organisation of the Whole is taken in hand and perfected. Then indeed each separate member is under obligation to obey the behests of the Whole unconditionally. All activity is then shepherded into fixed channels. We have already seen the sort of movements and the sort of difficulties that have resulted in this sphere from a social-democratic ordering of society. But the problem is a wider one than that merely of social-democracy. It remains an open question how far the individual is bound by society and how far he may follow his own course. Of one thing, however, there can be no doubt, namely, that only by standing together have human beings been able to meet nature on equal terms.

2. *The warfare of man with man.* Man stands in need of his fellows if he is to

arrange his daily life upon a rational basis. But his attempt to do this brings him face to face with a multitude of oppositions and limitations which confront him variously with the problem which we are now considering. Man's judgments upon man differ even to contradiction. The optimist gives one verdict, the view of the pessimist is widely parted from his. The optimist treats man as a being of good will, ready to help his kind, whereas the pessimist teaches that evil preponderates in human nature. The optimist tends to put life's centre of gravity in individuals taken singly; he expects nothing but gain from complete individual liberty. But the thinker who inclines to pessimism will be urgent in his demands that the individual be limited by, and subordinated to, society. The one will advocate a mild, the other a severe, penal code, and above all the question here raised will be the deciding factor in determining the form of political constitution which the State will adopt. On the one side Hobbes and Schopenhauer, on the other Locke and Rousseau, pursue entirely different aims. As we examine the problem more closely we shall find ourselves lifted above and beyond any mere opposition of optimism and pessimism. We shall be forced to admit that the average of human nature is low, that there are few of noble and many of common disposition among us. But we must also recognise that natural gifts and forces

are hidden away in humanity which are capable of being raised to the surface and wakened into life. Man at first sight appears poor and small, but there is at work in human nature something spiritual, something even divine. Not only education but also our common social life must have faith in this spiritual and divine element—in humanity. But herein we see at the same time that a creative life is at work in us beyond and above the mere here and now. Viewed from the standpoint of the solution we have suggested ordinary optimism cannot but appear superficial, while pessimism would force us to abandon all hope of raising mankind and its final conclusion would be a “war of all against all.” We are left with the alternative of Activism which, while it by no means burkes the problem, points out at the same time a way of solving it. Clearly in this matter the individual and society must act in concert.

3. The greatest difficulty of all, however, lies in the innermost being of man himself. Man has within him the impulse to establish a world of independent life. Only upon such a basis can he build up a spiritual kingdom and a culture. He experiences a great enhancement of his powers when he is able to lay hold upon the world we have described as his very own, when he can refer to it the whole joy of his life. Experience, however, shows us that, within man himself, the

strongest opposition to this movement is to be met, because man is for ever impressing his spiritual powers into the service of *mere men*, in the last resort of merely isolated individuals. Herein not only are we compelled to recognise a great source of weakness of the life of the spirit but also a complete reversal of that life's proper direction, and the danger of the whole spiritual movement becomes the merest appearance, and of good and evil changing places. A contradiction arises *within* the life of the spirit, the forces that have been released no longer correspond to life's true goal, rather do they directly contradict it. This is by no means limited to one single point, on the contrary, whole complexes of thought can arise to serve only distortions and lies. From such a standpoint as this human life can be pictured only in sad and gloomy colours. Humanity, it is true, works unceasingly to ameliorate the outward phases of life—we may see in this fact an advance of culture. But internally this very culture may beget terrible mischiefs and it is possible that these may grow so vast that to deal with them will go beyond human capability. The result is always a crude contrast between very great advance in technical performance and moral degradation of soul. Evil then takes the form not of mere loss or damage, nor even of a mere handicap, but that of a complete perversion of the whole common life. In such a state of

affairs, the relationship of individual to society cannot but be the occasion of the greatest pessimism and doubt. The cause of humanity seems to be lost altogether when all human powers are used for man's own narrow interests alone. At this point the question arises whether, in such confusion as this, the problem might not receive new light upon its difficulties from the standpoint of Religion, and whether, in what is to all appearances a blind and endless conflict, victory may not still be possible. Such a victory would entirely change the aspect of the problem of the relation of individual to society.

When we review this movement in its entirety we are bound to recognise that a downward tendency is constantly fighting against the upward or evolutionary tendency, and that we have reason to fear that the former will prevail over the latter. Each of these facts point to a serious danger for the social life of mankind and at the same time also for the individual.

Remarks.

(1.) The work of civilisation has created vast complex systems, but the development of these systems has very often resulted in limiting the scope of the life of individuals or even in oppressing it. Each individual's effort is really outside the effort of every one else. Specialised work threatens to transform mankind into separate unrelated atoms.

Ever greater division of labour may easily result in his own little circle becoming the workman's whole universe, and all spiritual domination over his work may disappear. This will be found to be true not only of the separate individuals but of their whole civilisation. There, too, an inner unity will be all to seek. The several movements and causes find nothing to hold them together, they may easily drift into enmity and opposition. The result will be a breaking up of life into fragments, with the imminent danger of a degradation of the whole civilisation. There are no guiding ideas, there is no worthy goal.

(2.) As regards our second point, we saw that in the moral life also impulses to progress were not lacking and that human nature was by no means without its own impulsion towards the spiritual and the divine. But the desire for higher things is too often weak and poor. Men put themselves off very generally with mere idle sentiment. Desire is felt, no doubt, to enrich the social life of our fellow men, but no effort is made to deal with a man as a whole nor is any such love displayed as would lead to real union of soul with soul. All this may produce on the surface emotions which are valuable enough in their way, but it does not grasp completely, it cannot create a new world.

(3.) In human life there is always active, in manifold ways, an opposition to that

degeneration of the good which is so clearly in evidence. This opposition, however, is not powerful enough to master evil fundamentally. Certain manifestations and effects of evil are indeed met and countered, but the good still lacks a true and essential and thoroughly thought-out content. We cannot hide from ourselves that civilisation tends to value appearance more than substance and thereby makes the whole of human development fall a victim to a sort of moral un-
 veracity. The perplexities which arise from this fact cannot fail to spread their baneful influence upon the relation between individual and society also.

C. The final reconciliation.

From these considerations we arrive at the conclusion that human life and human society present an aspect that is both melancholy and purposeless unless there emerge a great change of direction motivated by more than merely human power, unless an independent spiritual force, a self-subsisting spiritual world, transform the whole of human existence. The character that this Spiritual Power must manifest can be clearly seen at every important point. Religion it is, founded upon a true metaphysic, that directs the movement towards a new world. This enables us to set the power of new creative energies against that dismemberment of life which has resulted from the division of labour. I say

“energies” rather than “ideas,” for insistence upon *ideas* would give an exaggerated value to the intellectual element in life. As we know, ideas are often quite lacking in penetrating force. In universal life it has been *energies* that have opposed to doleful confusion a creative power. *Energies* are the moving force in the world’s story. Taking a wide survey, they appear as divine revelation, as miracle, as more than the mere work of men. How little result the mere work of men can lay claim to, we see only too clearly to-day. Of ourselves we are unable to create such energies, but we may bring to meet them an open and generous mind and loyally place our powers at their disposal. They will enable us to re-create our courage and our strength.

And secondly we saw that a certain natural reaction is even now at work against the low and the mean. But this reaction cannot attain unto victory unless it is raised to a sphere above all that is merely subjective or merely human. Even what ordinarily passes for love is generally poor and fleeting; a love must be found that will make itself the core of our being, that will go out beyond all the contradictions of human life and will meet with joyousness even the limitations that bar our way. But that can result only from the living power of free Spirit, or to put it in a few words, from a Love that is of God.

Thirdly we saw that the forces of perversion threatened to be victorious in the end. This turn of things we shall be unable to face unless a new life be vouchsafed to us with fresh and new power at its command. We must be enabled to win freedom from all that opposes and limits us, from all that distorts and perverts. Whether we think of the individual or the common social order, our experience is the same. In each sphere individuality as a phenomenon of nature must be subsumed into a personality founded upon the divine life and transcending the natural world. We must recognise and make our own an independent source of creative power. Man must raise himself above the interests of the work-a-day world and its society into a world of original creation. At that point also the institution of a common social order will become possible as a Kingdom of God and of Spirit opens up before us.

It is indeed one of the root ideas of Religion and especially of Christianity that above all goals for which statesmen may strive, a fellowship that has its foundations in God brings into view a new social order and thereby calls the human race to partake in the Perfect, the Eternal, the Everlasting. It is worthy of note that even thinkers such as Comte who rejected all transcendental ideas, urged with much insistence the creation of a super-political society. He was rightly of opinion that only such a social

order as that would be able to take in hand the task of educating the inner soul of man, and that it alone could produce a result that would endure. Without it, man would be abandoned haphazard to the interests and the strife of political parties. But Comte was in no position to give this thought a firm and true basis. At their root, the things from which he expected deliverance were helpful only in appearance. We are accordingly left with Religion alone to raise us above these perplexities by transplanting us into a life that transcends humanity, nay, that transcends this whole universe. In Religion alone does humanity become possessed of a fixed aim and of a true inner consistency.

In all human effort a longing for a fixed and certain goal is implicit. Only in such a goal can the relation between the individual and society find its true form. But while we cling firmly to this high vision, we must allow that mankind can seek this goal at various levels and in various directions. We may not neglect, let alone despise the lower levels, because we are dependent upon them, as human beings, for the preservation of our natural life and our economic order. We must indeed hold fast the faith that the fight will be followed by victory, and that in life's innermost sanctuary we shall reach a complete affirmation of all values, but it remains true all the same that life is predominantly a place of struggle, and we may not withdraw

ourselves from our proper share in that struggle. We must, therefore, hold before us struggle and victory, the one and the other. We may never forget that within our human compass it is not possible to attain to an immediate and complete affirmation, but that, on the contrary, in these decisive vital questions, the way to affirmation lies through negation. This is the especially characteristic mark of Christian thought. With the fullest recognition of what is dark and evil in the world the Christian still manifests a confident conviction of the final victory of the good. In the light of that conviction the mutual relation between the individual and society will find its full elucidation, the *individual* will be liberated from cramping isolation and in an inner uplifting, the community will enter upon full possession of itself.

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
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